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This paper studies how the investors’ attitude towards earnings sur-
prises affects the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings in an in-
tertemporal context, where the consensus forecast of the analysts is not
exogenously given but determined by the strategic interaction between
the analysts and the managers. Our analysis shows that given the asym-
metric investors’ reaction to earnings surprises, managers have strong in-
centives to manipulate earnings. In dependence on their time preferences,
managers may choose to manipulate the earnings in order to match the
consensus forecasts. In this equilibrium, rational investors are systemati-
cally fooled. Assuming that managers’ preferences are equally distributed
in the economy, we also derive conclusions on how the absolute level of
manipulation in the economy changes with the investors’ preferences, the
managers’ compensation package and the earnings guidance they may pro-
vide to analysts.
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1 Introduction
Each quarter, the attention of the investors’ community is drawn to the earnings
numbers reported by public companies. However, these numbers themselves are
of much less relevance than their value relative to certain benchmarks.
The main benchmarks investors use are the previous earnings (Burgstahler
and Dichev, 1997) and the analysts’ consensus forecast (Degeorge, Patel, and
Zeckhauser, 1999; Brown, 2001, and Matsumoto, 1999; Freeman and Tse, 1992).
Compelling empirical evidence suggests that firms falling short of the bench-
marks are priced at a discount, which is larger in absolute terms than the pre-
mium the firms get when they report earnings above the benchmark (Kasznik
and McNichols, 2002; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002).
Ultimately, executives seem also to believe that hitting earnings benchmarks
strengthens their creditability, helps increasing their companies’ stock price
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005) as well as their compensation (Mat-
sunaga and Park, 2001).
Given the empirical evidence on the relevance of benchmarks, we analyze
the question how the asymmetric price response to meeting and falling short
of the benchmarks affects the reporting decision of the managers. Assuming
that the benchmarks are exogenously given, previous studies conclude that the
observed patterns in the managers’ reporting are due to earnings management.
However, it is not clear whether managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings
remain unchanged when this assumption does not hold. In particular, it is
ambiguous whether and how managers would manipulate earnings when the
analysts behave strategically when playing the earnings game.
To answer this question, we propose a three–period model with a manager,
analysts and investors endowed with behavioral preferences. We show that when
the manager and the analysts behave strategically, the manager’s incentives to
manipulate earnings change as a response to the investors’ preferences defining
the market conditions, the manager’s compensation package and the manager’s
guidance provided to analysts. In particular, our results suggest that given
the asymmetric investors’ reaction to earnings surprises, the manager strongly
prefers to manipulate earnings than to report truthfully independently of her
compensation package. If the manager is roughly indifferent between selling
shares in the current or later periods, she manipulates the earnings in order to
meet the analysts forecasts. In this equilibrium rational investors are system-
atically fooled. In all other cases, investors are able to reverse the manager’s
manipulation so that the reporting decision of the manager depends strictly
on her time preferences. Assuming that manager’s preferences are equally dis-
tributed in the economy, we also derive conclusions on how the absolute level of
manipulation in the economy changes with the investors’ preferences, the man-
ager’s compensation and the earnings guidance she may provide to analysts.
Our results suggest that whatever the manager’s compensation there will be
less manipulation in absolute terms when investors have behavioral preferences.
The absolute level of manipulation may also decrease if the manager are com-
pensated with stock options instead of shares independently on the investor’s
preferences. However, if investors are non–behavioral and the managers holding
stock options provide earnings guidance, i.e anticipates the action of the ana-
lysts to their earnings reports, the absolute manipulation level in the economy
would increase compared to the no–guidance case.
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In our framework, the manager’s decision to manipulate earnings is a matter
of an inter–temporal substitution. The manager may shift revenues from one
year to another at costs determined by the investors and in particular by their
preferences with respect to earnings reports.
Previous research on the question why managers manipulate earnings re-
ports provides other explanations. Using the idea that earnings management is
costly, Chaney and Lewis (1994) show that managers manipulate earnings to
signal their ability to generate value. By smoothing reporting earnings around
the ”expected” earnings report, high-value managers can increase the proba-
bility that investors identify their ability of generating value correctly. On the
other hand, if low-value managers realize that the costs of misreporting exceeds
the benefits of being identified as a high-value firm, then the earnings signals of
the firms can be perfectly informative in equilibrium. Instead of manipulating
earnings in order to make investors believe the firm is more valuable, Trueman
and Titman (1989) show that firms manipulate earnings because they want in-
vestors to perceive the firm as less risky. According to their model, lower-quality
firms mimic higher-quality firms by smoothing the earnings reports, which low-
ers the investors’ assessment of the probability of bankruptcy. Managers may
also manipulate earnings because investors are unable to observe the manager’s
objectives and adjust to the bias added to the earnings reports. The manager’s
optimal level of manipulation is then determined by the trade-off between some
costs of earnings management and the benefit of higher stock price resulting
from higher reported earnings (see Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000). This idea
is also used by Guttman, Kadan and Kandel (2004) in order to explain why
earnings reports are discontinuous around some thresholds. By hiding some of
their private information in a pooled report managers with different economic
earnings are able to increase their payoff by reducing the costs of earnings ma-
nipulation. Further, firm’s earnings management choice may also be driven by
the choices made by its rivals. If a firm is compared by investors and creditors
with other firms in the same industry, it would manage its earnings simply be-
cause it expect its rivals to do so (see Bagnoli and Watts, 2000). Finally, Stein
(1989) suggests that earnings management occurs if managers are myopic. The
conclusion rests basically on the assumption that investors form expectations
based on the noise in the earnings signals but not on the level of earnings relative
to certain thresholds.
The importance of thresholds is, however, emphasized in several empirical
studies. Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) find that firms that report continuously
growing earnings are priced at a premium to other firms and the premium
increases with the length of the string. Myers and Skinner (2001) find that
managers of such firms usually have relatively large amount of personal wealth
invested in the company providing them with incentives to extend the earnings
string making accounting choices that avoid reporting adverse earnings.
The relevance of the consensus forecast is highlighted by other studies.
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that firms which meet expectations receive
a higher market value than firms that fail to meet the expectations. Although
they additionally conjecture that firms consistently meeting the consensus do
so through strong earnings, they cannot exclude the possibility that firms could
meet expectations by earnings manipulation and investors may fail to antici-
pate this. In a recent study, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (2006) investigate
the price response to earnings reports meeting the consensus forecast over time.
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They find that firms meeting or exceeding earnings thresholds experience eco-
nomically and statistically significant excess returns, which are particularly high
in a bull market. Their results motivate them to conjecture that investors seem
to view earnings threshold attainment as an important indicator of the health
of the company, which encourage the managers to manipulate earnings. To test
the benefits from earnings manipulation, Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) exam-
ine the manner by which earnings management contributes to the premium that
firms receive when they meet or beet earnings expectations. They confirm that
firms receive a premium if they manage to meet or beet the consensus forecast
and show, in addition, that investors are capable to discern the effect of earnings
management on the earnings surprise and discount the resulting surprise, but
the extent of this discount is small and not economically significant. Further,
Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that the stock price response to falling short of
the analysts expectations is disproportionately large for growth stocks.
Our research contributes the literature on earning management in several
ways. First, we extent the theoretical literature by studying a three-period
strategic game between a manager and the analysts rather than a one–shot
disclosure choice of different firms involved in a signaling game with other com-
petitors. That is, instead of assuming that there are high- and low-value firms
manipulating earnings to pool their reports, we use the empirical evidence that
investors value earnings reports with respect to thresholds to study the man-
ager’s manipulation incentives in a setting where the threshold is not exoge-
nously given but defined by analysts behaving strategically. Thus, the focus of
our study is not the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings when playing
a game with other managers endowed with private information regarding their
value as in the signaling literature. Instead we focus on the manager’s incentives
to manipulate earnings when the manager is involved in a strategic game with
the analysts. Whereas the signaling literature assumes that the differences in
the managers’ type motivating earnings manipulation are exogenously given, we
specify the analysts’ response representing a threshold for the value of earnings
reports endogenously.
Second, by studying manager’s manipulation incentives when her payoff is
defined by behavioral investors we contribute to the general discussion on the
economic relevance of investors’ preferences for earnings reports that are at
or above the target defined by the analysts. Some empirical studies have al-
ready hypothesized that this investors’ attitude motivate managers to manip-
ulate earnings in order to meet the targets (see for example Degeorge, Patel,
Zeckhauser, 1999). However, they did not explicitly considered the possibility
that analysts may be fairly aware of their role as target setters, which again
may change the manager’s motivation to manipulate earnings.
Finally, our analysis contribute to the literature dealing with the definition of
regulatory standards. By studying a simple economy where the managers’ time
preferences are equally distributed, we derive conclusions on how the absolute
level of manipulation in that economy change with the investors’ preferences,
the managers’ compensation package and the earnings guidance provided by
managers to analysts.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the infor-
mation structure of the game and the decision processes of the manager, the
investors and the analysts. Section 3 defines the players of the game, their strat-
egy sets and payoffs. It also defines the game equilibria. The players’ strategies
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in equilibrium are studied in section 4. The analysis is structured in three parts.
The first part considers the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings when
managers hold stock options and play the earnings game with behavioral and
non–behavioral investors. The second part studies the managers’ incentives to
manipulate earnings, when they hold stock options instead of shares and play
the earnings game with behavioral and non–behavioral investors. The third part
analyzes how the manager decide on earnings manipulation when she provide
earnings guidance to analysts. The main results as well as the implications of
the market conditions, the manager’s compensation and the manager’s guidance
on the absolute level of manipulation in the economy are summarized in section
5.
2 Information Structure and Decision Timing
We consider a three–period economy with one firm, analysts and a large number
of investors. The firm is controlled by a manager. The information structure
and the decision order of the agents in the economy are summarized as follows.
t− 1 t t+ 1
1. Analysts: Ft 1. Nature: xt 1. Nature: xt+1
2. Manager: Dt 2. Manager: Dt+1
3. Analysts: Ft+1 3. Investors: Pt+1, Ct+1
4. Investors: Pt, Ct
In period t − 1, the analysts make forecasts on the earnings that will be
reported by the manager in period t. The average of their forecasts in this
period, i.e. the consensus forecast, is denoted by Ft.
At the beginning of period t, nature chooses which state of ”true” earnings
xt ∈ {x, x} realizes. All agents in the economy agree that the probability for
observing x is p and the probability for observing x is respectively 1 − p. The
”true” earnings are also assumed to be common knowledge, so that the firm’s
outsiders know the moments of the ”true” earnings distribution. However, only
the manager is able to observe which state of ”true” earnings realizes in each
period.
After observing xt and Ft, the manager decides whether and how to manip-
ulate earnings. In dependence on the state of ”true” earnings and the manipu-
lation decision of the manager, earnings reports in period t are Dt = (Dt, Dt),
where Dt = xt+m and Dt = xt+m, with m as the manipulation decision of the
manager given that xt = x, and m as the manipulation decision of the manager
given that xt = x. We assume that the manager’s discretion to manipulate earn-
ings is limited by certain bounds, i.e. m,m ∈ [mmin,mmax], where mmax > 0
and mmin < 0. That is, the manager is allowed to inflate or deflate earnings
but her report cannot be too far away from the ”true” earnings, otherwise the
auditors would not accept it. For simplicity we assume that |mmax| = |mmin|.
The bounds in our setting are common knowledge.
The analysts use the manager’s report Dt to update their beliefs regarding
the next period earnings the manager will be able to report. The consensus
forecast is captured by Ft+1. Depending on the observed earnings in period
t, i.e. Dt or Dt, the consensus forecast for the earnings reported in t + 1 are
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denoted by F t+1 respectively F t+1. The analysts communicate their updated
expectations to investors and they respond by adjusting the price of the firm’s
shares Pt = (P t, P t), which returns the value of the firm’s stock options Ct =
(Ct, Ct). In our notation, P t (P t) is the price of the firm’s shares and Ct (Ct)
captures the value of the firm’s stock options in period t given that xt = x
(xt = x) and Dt = Dt (Dt = Dt).
In the last period, nature draws the ”true” earnings xt+1 ∈ {x, x}. In this
period, we assume that the manager does not make any decisions. His reporting
is defined by the ”true” earnings realizing in this period and the manipulation
decision taken one period before. This is consistent with accounting standards
such as GAAP requiring that any discretionary element in reported earnings
must be eventually reversed over time so that at the end of the game, there is no
manipulation remained in the economy and the accumulated reported earnings
reported are equal to the accumulated ”true” earnings. We operationalize this
institutional requirement through a GAAP constrained requiring that the bias
added in the period t is reversed in the next one. The earnings reports in the
last period are then Dt+1 = (x−m,x−m,x−m,x−m) with xt+1 ∈ {x, x}.
Given the reported earnings Dt+1 = (x −m,x −m,x −m,x −m) and the
consensus forecast Ft+1 = (F t+1, F t+1), the investors determine the price of the
company’s shares Pt+1 = (P t+1, P t+1) where P t+1 is the price of firm’s shares
given that xt = x respectively Dt = Dt and P t+1 is the price of firm’s shares
given that xt = x respectively Dt = Dt.
The players’ actions in each state are summarized in the following figure.
´
´´
Q
QQ
p
1− p
Ft
x, Dt = x+m, P t, Ct, F t+1
x, Dt = xt +m, P t, Ct, F t+1
³³
³
PPP
p
1− p
x, Dt+1 = x−m, P t+1, Ct+1
x, Dt+1 = x−m, P t+1, Ct+1
³³
³
PPP
p
1− p
x, Dt+1 = x−m, P t+1, Ct+1
x, Dt+1 = x−m, P t+1, Ct+1
The order of events in our model is specified to be as realistic as possible.
Alternative designs are also conceivable. For example, the analysts may need
some time to issue the next period forecast, so that the immediate price response
of the investors in period t does not include the expectations of the analysts.
Alternatively, the analysts may issue several forecasts in the period t so that
each time the investors need to adjust their expectations and the price of firm’s
shares. These alternative decision designs do not affect our results given that all
firm’s outsiders share the same expectations regarding the next period reporting
earnings.
2.1 The Investors
From the manager’s perspective, the investors represent a homogenous group
that determines the price of the firm’s shares using all available information
efficiently. In line with the empirical evidence (see for example Kasznik and
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McNichols, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Kinney et. al., 2001), we assume
that the price response to deviations from the consensus earnings forecast is
asymmetric. Investors reward companies for meeting or beating analysts’ earn-
ings expectations but penalize them stronger for falling below this target in-
dependently of the firm’s absolute performance. In models with asymmetric
information, the reason underlying this price response is the apparent informa-
tion content in earnings surprises regarding the future earnings potential of the
firm. In this context, earnings manipulation is a signaling device. In our model,
the main driver for a manager deciding on her reporting strategy is not her
private information. Instead, we attempt to explain manager’s decisions by the
preferences of the investors while imposing minimal restriction on the distribu-
tion of information among the agents in the economy. In particular, we assume
that investors are averse against negative earnings surprises because from their
perspective, the consensus forecast represents a reference point against which
investors judge earnings announcements and determine ultimately the value of
the company.
At least since the contribution of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the impor-
tance of reference points became one of the main issues of research on decision
making under uncertainty. One of their core findings is that the disutility from
a loss looms greater than the utility from a similar gain. Kahneman and Tver-
sky call this property loss aversion. We use the idea that investors may be loss
averse when evaluating the earnings reported by the company to model the price
response to earnings reports.
In our setting, the price of the firm’s shares is determined by two factors.
The first is the present value of the firm’s earnings reported at the end of each
period. The second factor is a premium (or discount) for meeting (falling short
of) investors’ expectations. Formally, the market value of the firm’s shares in
period t respectively t+ 1 can be written as:
Pt = Dt + δEItDt+1 + v(Dt − Ft) (1)
and
Pt+1 = Dt+1 + v(Dt+1 − Ft+1) (2)
where δ = 11+r is the discounting rate and r is the interest rate representing the
time value of money. F is the consensus earnings forecast. EI represents the
investors’ expectations, which are assumed to be equivalent to the expectations
of the analysts EA.
The function v(.) is the value function proposed by Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979) describing individual behavior under uncertainty. We use the idea
that investors may be loss averse when evaluating the earnings reported by the
company and specify the function v as follows:
v(∆) =
{
∆ for ∆ ≥ 0
β∆ for ∆ < 0 (3)
In our setting, ∆ is the earnings surprise in each period, i.e. ∆t = Dt − Ft and
∆t+1 = Dt+1 − Ft+1. The parameter β > 1 represents the investors’ loss aver-
sion. The higher the loss aversion, the stronger is the investors’ disutility from
a negative earnings surprise and the lower would be the price of the company’s
shares in this period. In our setting the loss aversion parameter β > 1 reflects
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the asymmetry in the earnings response function observed in empirical studies,
e.g. by Kinney et.al. (2001).
2.2 The Managers
The manager of the firm is responsible for the earnings reported at the end of
each period. The manager chooses her earnings report in order to maximize the
expected utility, which is specified as a function of the price of firm’s shares in
period t and t+ 1, i.e.
uM (Pt, Pt+1, θ) = (1− θ)g(Pt) + θδEMt g(Pt+1) (4)
EM (.) represents the manager’s expectations, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 is a factor determin-
ing the relative importance of the market price of firm’s shares in period t and
t + 1 from the manager’s perspective and g(.) is a function describing the de-
pendence of the manager’s payoff on the price of the firm’s shares. Note that
the manager’s objective function includes only direct monetary consequences of
earnings manipulation. Although including punishments for earnings manipu-
lation and other external payments may be realistic, their consideration would
be arbitrary.
There are a number of reasons why the manager might be interested in the
market price of the firm’s shares. One reason is the manager’s compensation. If
it is based on shares, the manager can sell them in period t and (or) in period
t + 1 as a response to some liquidity needs for example. If the manager holds
shares, the function g(.) is linear and θ represents the percentage of shares that
the manager prefers to carry over from period t to period t + 1. Alternatively,
manager’s interests may be linked to the price of the firm’s shares if the man-
ager’s compensation package contains stock options. In this case the function
g(.) is non–linear and 1 − θ is the percentage of options that the manager is
allowed to exercise in period t respectively the percentage of options that expire
in period t.
In the following analysis we assume that θ represent the percentage of shares
or stock options that the manager desires to carry over to the next period ac-
cording to her time preferences. It is also realistic to assume that the manager’s
time preferences are private knowledge.
Finally, we assume that all earnings are paid as dividends at the end of each
period. There are no investments or share repurchases, and the company is
all-equity financed.
2.3 The Analysts
Empirical evidence suggests that the career advancement of the analysts is
closely linked to the accuracy of their predictions (see for example Hong and
Kubik, 2003). Since ”true” earnings are observable only by the firm’s manager,
the performance of the analysts can only be measured against the earnings re-
ported by the manager. Thus, the incentive of the average analyst is to provide
a forecast that is as close as possible to the reported rather than to the ”true”
earnings. In particular, we assume that the earnings forecasts of the average
analyst are determined by a quadratic loss function.
LA(Ft, Ft+1) = −EAt−1(Ft −Dt)2 − EAt (Ft+1 −Dt+1)2 (5)
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where EA represents the expectations of the average analysts.
3 The Earnings Game
The analysts are aware that their forecasts may affect the earnings reported by
the manager since the consensus forecast is used by investors as a target when
evaluating the value of firm’s shares based on the earnings reports. On the other
hand, the manager knows that analysts’ consensus forecast affecting the price
of the firm’s shares and stock options depends on her reporting. Thus, one can
expect that the manager and the analysts behave strategically when deciding
what earnings numbers to report respectively to forecast.
To describe the situation in which the manager and the analysts act in a set-
ting of strategic interpendence we define the game Γ = [I = {M,A}, {SM , SA}, {UM , UA}]
where I denotes the players in the game, SM is the strategy space of the man-
ager, SA is the strategy space of the average analyst, UM denotes the manager’s
payoff function and UA is the payoff function of the average analyst.
In our setting the players of the game include the manager of the firm and
the analysts estimating the earnings of the company announced at the end of
each reporting period. The investors determine the market price of the firm’s
shares but they do not behave strategically. Their expectations can be regarded
as equivalent to the expectations of the average analyst.1
In our setting, firm’s outsiders are required to make decisions under asym-
metric information. Since they are not able to observe which state of ”true”
earnings has been realized in the previous period, they cannot determine the
manipulation included in the earnings reported by the manager. This informa-
tion is however essential for the next period earnings reports expected by firm’s
outsiders because they know that any manipulation done in period t is reversed
in period t+ 1.
The expected manipulation of firm’s outsiders is determined by the level
of manipulation and the probability that the manager has manipulated the
earnings in this way. We denote the level of manipulation expected by the firm’s
outsiders as n = (n, n), where n (n) is the manipulation conjecture of the firm’s
outsiders given that xt = x (xt = x). Thus, when estimating the probability
that the manager has manipulated the earnings reports by n respectively n,
firm’s outsiders estimate the probability that nature has drawn x respectively
x. The prior probability for xt = x is p. The posterior belief of the firm’s
outsiders after that xt = xt after observing Dt is denoted by µ(x|Dt). We
assume that the posterior beliefs are formed by Bayes rule, i.e.
µ(x|Dt) = p(Dt|x)p
p(Dt|x)p+ p(Dt|x)(1− p) (6)
where p(Dt|x) is the conditional probability for observing Dt given that xt = x
and p(Dt|x) is the conditional probability for observing Dt given that xt = x.
For example, if Dt = Dt = Dt then µ(x|Dt) = p and if Dt 6= Dt then µ(x|Dt) =
1 if xt = x and µ(x|Dt) = 0 if xt = x.
1In addition to providing earnings forecasts analysts are required to issue detailed reports
with their private information regarding the earnings prospects of the firms they cover. As
non–strategic players, investors are assumed to trust the information provided by the informed
party and adjust the price of the firm’s shares accordingly.
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Overall, the payoff of the analysts is maximal if they can ”read” behind
the earnings numbers. This is possible if they know the possible manipulation
actions of the manager and estimate the probability for these actions correctly.
In equilibrium, the analysts’ conjecture on the level of manipulation n = (n, n)
must be correct. Thus, in equilibrium analysts’ forecast errors occur only if the
analysts updating their beliefs rationally are unable to distinguish which state
of ”true” earnings has been realized, i.e. if they cannot distinguish whether the
manager has manipulated earnings up or down.
The strategies available to the analysts are given by the consensus forecast
in each period SA = (Ft, Ft+1|Ft ∈ R, Ft+1 = (F t+1, F t+1)) where F t+1 is the
analysts’ consensus forecast for Dt+1 given that Dt = Dt = x + n and F t+1 is
the analysts’ consensus forecast for Dt+1 given that Dt = Dt = x+ n.
Using this notation and considering the information structure of the game,
the payoff of the analysts (5) is redefined as a function of the expected loss in
period t and t+ 1 as follows:
UA(Ft, Dt, Ft+1, Dt+1) = f
(
LA(Ft), LA(Ft+1)
)
(7)
where
LA(Ft, Dt) = −p(Dt − Ft)2 − (1− p)(Dt − Ft)2
and
LA(Ft+1, Dt+1) = −p(Dt+1 − Ft+1)2 − (1− p)(Dt+1 − Ft+1)2
with
Dt = x+ n
Dt = x+ n
Dt+1 = x− [µ(x|Dt)n+ (1− µ)(x|Dt)n]
Dt+1 = x− [µ(x|Dt)n+ (1− µ)(x|Dt)n]
µ(x|Dt) is the posterior belief of the analysts that the reported earnings Dt are
based on the ”true” earnings x as defined in equation (6).
Analysts aiming to provide accurate forecasts are therefore most concerned
with estimating the manipulated part of earnings n and n. In period t, the
analysts do not have any other information besides the probability distribution
of ”true” earnings. The best analysts’ forecast in this period is therefore the
mean of ”true” earnings plus the expected manipulation where the expectations
are based on the probability distribution of the ”true” earnings. In period t+1
the analysts are able to update their beliefs regarding the manipulation done in
the previous period. In this period, their best forecast is therefore the mean of
”true” earnings minus the expected manipulation based on the posterior beliefs
of the analysts formed after observing the earnings reported in the period before.
Formally, the analysts’ best response is:
F ∗t = pDt + (1− p)Dt
= px+ (1− p)x+ pn+ (1− p)n (8)
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and
F ∗t+1 = pDt+1 + (1− p)Dt+1
= px+ (1− p)x− [µ(x|Dt)n+ (1− µ)(x|Dt)n] (9)
The investors in our model do not behave strategically. They adopt the
expectations of the analysts and determine the price of firm’s shares. At the
end of period t investors observe the earnings reported by the manager, compare
them with the analysts’ forecasts and build expectations regarding the future
reported earnings, which are assumed to be equivalent to the expectations of
the analysts. Thus, in dependence on the ”true” earnings realization in period
t, the prices of companies’ share in period t and t+ 1 are either
P t = Dt + δF t+1 + v(Dt − Ft) (10)
and
P t+1 = Dt+1 + v(Dt+1 − F t+1) (11)
or
P t = Dt + δF t+1 + v(Dt − Ft) (12)
and
P t+1 = Dt+1 + v(Dt+1 − F t+1) (13)
The strategy space of the manager is defined over the manipulated part of
the reported earnings in each state of ”true” earnings that realizes in period t,
i.e. SM = (m,m) ∈ [mmin,mmax]. This manipulation determined the level of
reported earnings in period t and t+ 1 since the ”true” earnings are predefined
and constant over time.
The manager’s payoff is defined in (4). More specifically, manager’s payoff
is UM = (U
M
(.), UM (.)) in dependence on the ”true” earnings realization in
period t, where
U
M
(Dt, Ft, Ft+1) = (1− θ)P t(Dt, F t+1, Ft) + θδEMt P t+1(Dt+1, F t+1) (14)
respectively
UM (Dt, Ft, Ft+1) = (1− θ)P t(Dt, F t+1, Ft) + θδEMt P t+1(Dt+1, F t+1) (15)
with price functions Pt = (P t, P t) and Pt+1 = (P t+1, P t+1) as defined in (10),
(11), (12) and (13).
Using the players’ strategy spaces and payoffs listed above, we define two
equilibriums. In the first equilibrium, each player takes the action of the other
players as given and chooses the strategy that maximizes the payoff. This is
summarized in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). The strategy profile (m∗, n∗, F ∗t , F ∗t+1, P
∗
t , P
∗
t+1)
with m∗ = (m∗,m∗), n∗ = (n∗, n∗), F ∗t+1 = (F
∗
t+1, F
∗
t+1), P
∗
t = (P
∗
t , P
∗
t ) and
P ∗t+1 = (P
∗
t+1, P
∗
t+1) together with the posterior beliefs µ of the analysts about
the state of ”true” earnings in period t is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (in pure
strategies) if:
1. µ is determined by Bayes rule as in (6) whenever Dt = (x+m,x+m),
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2. P
∗
t = D
∗
t + δF
∗
t+1 + v(D
∗
t − F ∗t )
P
∗
t+1 = D∗t+1 + v(D
∗
t+1 − F
∗
t+1)
P ∗t = D
∗
t + δF
∗
t+1 + v(D
∗
t − F ∗t )
P ∗t+1 = D
∗
t+1 + v(D
∗
t+1 − F ∗t+1)
3. For all Ft, Ft+1 ∈ SA
UA(F ∗t , F
∗
t+1;D
∗
t , D
∗
t+1) ≥ UA(Ft, Ft+1;D∗t , D∗t+1)
where the function UA(.) is defined as in (7)
4. For all m ∈ SM
UM (D∗t , D
∗
t+1;F
∗
t , F
∗
t+1) ≥ UM (Dt, Dt+1;F ∗t , F ∗t+1)
where the function UM (.) is defined as in (14) and in (15) and
5. m∗ = n∗ respectively m∗ = n∗.
In the second equilibrium concept, we consider the possibility that the man-
ager is allowed to talk to the analysts and communicate her view on the next
period earnings that she is going to report. Such statements summarized in
earnings estimates are known as earnings guidance. They are relevant for the
manager’s incentives to manipulate earnings for several reasons. First, earnings
guidance influences the consensus forecast since analysts need to adjust their
expectations according to the announced reporting strategy in order to mini-
mize their mean forecasts errors, i.e. n = m respectively n = m. Second, the
manager providing earnings guidance would, in equilibrium, anticipate the an-
alysts’ reaction to her announcements and change her reporting (manipulation)
strategy accordingly. If the manager guides the analysts, she solve a similar
problem as the leader in Stackelberg’s leader–follower game. The equilibrium
in the setting with guidance is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium with Guidance). The strategy profile
(m∗, F ∗t , F
∗
t+1, P
∗
t , P
∗
t+1) with m
∗ = (m∗,m∗), F ∗t+1 = (F
∗
t+1, F
∗
t+1), P
∗
t =
(P
∗
t , P
∗
t ) and P
∗
t+1 = (P
∗
t+1, P
∗
t+1) together with the posterior beliefs µ of the
analysts about the state of ”true” earnings in period t is a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium (in pure strategies) if:
1. µ is determined by Bayes rule as in (6) whenever Dt = {x+m,x+m},
2. P
∗
t = D
∗
t + δF
∗
t+1 + v(D
∗
t − F ∗t )
P
∗
t+1 = D∗t+1 + v(D
∗
t+1 − F
∗
t+1)
P ∗t = D
∗
t + δF
∗
t+1 + v(D
∗
t − F ∗t )
P ∗t+1 = D
∗
t+1 + v(D
∗
t+1 − F ∗t+1)
3. For all m ∈ SM
UM (D∗t , D
∗
t+1;EA(D∗t ),EA(D∗t+1)) ≥ UM (Dt, Dt+1;EA(D∗t ),EA(D∗t+1))
where the function UM (.) is defined as in (14) and in (15) and
EA(D∗t ) = px+ (1− p)x+ pm∗ + (1− p)m∗
EA(D∗t+1) = px+ (1− p)x− [µ(x|D∗t )m∗ + (1− µ)(x|D∗t )m∗]
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4 Players’ Strategies in Equilibrium
The following analysis aims to show how the manipulation decision of the man-
ager depends on the market conditions, the manager’s compensation package
and the guidance provided by the manager to the firm’s outsiders. The market
conditions are defined with respect to the investors’ attitude towards earnings
reports that are above or below the analysts’ consensus forecast. The compen-
sation package of the manager may include either shares or stock options of the
company. The manager may or may not provide guidance to the analysts.
When analyzing the relevance of the market conditions, we distinguish two
cases. First, we consider a situation where the investors do not use the analysts’
forecasts as a reference point when determining the price of firm’s shares. We
denote this situation by B for ”non–behavioral”. In this case, analysts’ forecasts
are not a target that the manager aim to meet when deciding to manipulate
earnings since there is no premium the manager can get by reporting earnings
at or above the consensus forecast. Nevertheless, analysts’ expectations with
respect to the manipulated part of earnings affect the price of the company
shares since the investors are supposed to adapt them fully and adjust the price
of the firm’s shares accordingly. In this case, the analysts are only information
providers. Second, we consider a situation where analysts are target setters
and information providers at the same time. We denote this situation by B
for ”behavioral”. In this case, the analysts’ reports and forecasts are used
by investors not only to build expectations regarding the manipulated part of
earnings but also to determine whether the price of the firm’s shares should
include a premium (or a discount) from meeting (falling short of) the consensus
forecast.
The manipulation decision of the manager depends additionally on the man-
ager’s compensation package. We assume that the manager is compensated
either with company shares (S) or with stock options (C), which can be sold re-
spectively exercised in both periods. The percentage of shares respectively stock
options hold by the manager reflects her time preferences, which are assumed
to be private knowledge. If the manager holds stocks then her payoff is linked
directly to the market price of firm’s shares. In contrast, if the manager holds
stock options with an exercise price equal to the expected value of ”true” earn-
ings, the payoff of the manager is affected only if the price of the firm’s shares
increases above the fundamental value of the firm, i.e. the expected value of
”true” earnings.
The optimal reporting depends additionally on whether the manager does
(G) or does not guide (G). The difference is in the manager’s and analysts’
attitude toward the actions of the other players. In particular, if the manager
provides guidance, the analysts would follow it in order to minimize their mean
squared forecast errors. The manager anticipates the reaction of the analysts’
and adjust her manipulation strategy accordingly. If the manager does not
provide any guidance, she cannot be sure how the analysts will respond to her
reporting and choose the manipulation strategy that is best response to some
forecast of the analysts.
In equilibrium, the manager’s reporting can be either revealing (R) or non–
revealing (R). The reporting is revealing if the firm’s outsiders are able to
”read” behind the numbers and adjust their expectations in response to the
manipulation decision of the manager. The reporting is non–revealing if the
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firm’s outsiders cannot update their beliefs even if they act as rational Bayesians.
In the non–revealing equilibrium, the firm’s outsiders can be systematically
fooled.
4.1 Optimal Reporting of a Manager Playing with Behav-
ioral and Non–Behavioral Investors
Consider first the case where the manager holds shares (S), do not guide (G),
and the investors do not consider the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point
when evaluating the earnings reported by the manager, i.e. the function v(.)
does not affect the manager’s payoff, or (B). In this case, the manager does not
have incentives to meet the analysts forecasts so that her manipulation decision
is driven only by her time preferences θ and the time value of money δ. The
following theorem proves this.
Theorem 1 (SBGR reporting). If θ ∈ [0; 11+δ ), we obtain the following re-
vealing equilibrium:
m∗ = m∗ = n∗ = n∗ = mmax,
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmax
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmax,
P
∗
t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax),
P ∗t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax),
P
∗
t+1 = x−mmax,
P ∗t+1 = x−mmax
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (in pure strategies).
If θ = 11+δ , we obtain the following revealing equilibrium:
m∗ = m = n∗ = n∗ = 0,
F ∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x,
P
∗
t = x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x),
P ∗t = x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x),
P
∗
t+1 = x,
P ∗t+1 = x
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (in pure strategies).
If θ ∈ ( 11+δ , 1], we obtain the following revealing equilibrium
m∗ = m = n∗ = n∗ = mmin,
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmin
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin,
P
∗
t = x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin),
P ∗t = x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin),
P
∗
t+1 = x−mmin,
P ∗t+1 = x−mmin
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian equi-
librium (in pure strategies).
The intuition is the following. If investors do not consider the analysts’ fore-
casts as a reference point, the price of firm’s shares depends only on the present
value of the reported earnings, i.e. there is no premium (discount) for meeting
(falling short of) the analysts’ expectations. Thus, the manipulation decision
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of the manager can be considered as a pure income shift over time depending
on the time preferences of the manager θ and the time value of money δ but
not on the investors’ preferences β with respect to earnings reports above or
below the consensus forecast. The more shares the manager aims to sell in the
current (following) period, the stronger is her incentive to manipulate earnings
up (down) since the manipulation increases the price of the shares that the
manager is willing to sell in that period. In equilibrium, the manager prefers
to manipulate earnings in order to shift income according to her time prefer-
ences although the analysts see this, adjust their expectations and influence the
present value of the firm’s earnings. The only case where the manager does not
have any incentives to manipulate earnings is when money does not have any
time value. This is the case where δ = 1 and the manager is indifferent between
holding shares in period t or in period t+ 1, i.e. θ = 12 .
To see how the manager’s incentives to manipulate earnings change with the
market conditions, in the following we consider a situation where the investors
require a discount for holding the shares of firms reporting earnings below the
analysts’ expectations, i.e. if v(.) 6= 0 respectively if β > 1. In this case, the
manager has strong incentives to manipulate the earnings even if she is indif-
ferent between holding shares over both periods. In fact, it is this indifference
that motivates the manager to manipulate earnings as proved in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (SBGR reporting). If 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p) < θ <
1
1+δ and p >
1
2
we obtain the following non-revealing equilibrium:
m∗ = (1− p)(x− x),
m∗ = p(x− x),
F ∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x,
P
∗
t = x+(1−p)(x−x)+ δ(px+(1−p)x)+v(x+(1−p)(x−x)−px− (1−p)x),
P ∗t = x+ p(x− x) + δ(px+ (1− p)x) + v(x+ p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x),
P
∗
t+1 = x− (1− p)(x− x) + v(x− (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x),
P
∗
t+1 = x− (1− p)(x− x) + v(x− (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)
P ∗t+1 = x− p(x− x) + v(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x),
P ∗t+1 = x− p(x− x) + v(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ = p is a non–revealing Bayesian
equilibrium (in pure strategies).
The intuition for the existence of this equilibrium is the following. Given
that the ”true” earnings are above the consensus forecast, which is equal to
the expected ”true” earnings in this equilibrium, the manager deciding not to
manipulate earnings reports a positive surprise in the current period and a
positive or a negative surprise in the period ahead. If, however, the manager
sells shares in both periods, she has incentives to ”save” the earnings in the
current period reporting what the analysts expect and use the ”savings” to
cover losses that might occur in the next period, when the ”true” earnings are
below the consensus forecast. This is a better strategy for the manager since
reporting earnings below the consensus forecast is associated with a price decline
that cannot be compensated with a price increase following a positive earnings
surprise in the current period given that β > 1.
Similarly, if the ”true” earnings in the current period are below the consensus
forecast, the manager selling shares in both periods is better off if she ”borrow”
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earnings from the next period than to report a loss by reporting truthfully for
example. This is because the price decline due to the negative surprise in the
current period is stronger than the price increase in the future when the ”true”
earnings are above the consensus forecast given that β > 1. Thus, because of
the asymmetric price reaction to earnings surprises reflected in the loss aversion
parameter β > 1, the expected payoff of the manager is higher if she ”borrows”
earnings from the future to prevent reporting negative earnings surprises in the
current period and ”saves” earnings in the current period in order to prevent
reporting negative surprises in the future.
Note that this equilibrium exists only if β > 1. In other words, only if there
is a premium (discount) for meeting (falling short of) the analysts’ expecta-
tions, the manager has incentives to manipulate earnings in order to meet the
analysts’ forecasts so that in equilibrium her manipulation cannot be detected
by the firm’s outsiders. If β = 1, there is no manager who prefers to play this
equilibrium.
Overall, the higher the investors’ loss aversion, the higher is the manager’s
incentives to choose this equilibrium. This is reflected in the restrictions for the
manager’s time preferences θ. The higher the parameter β reflecting investors’
loss aversion, the lower is the lower bound of the parameter θ defining which
managers would choose to play this equilibrium. Outside the defined range the
managers prefer to follow a different strategy.
In the following we consider the extreme cases, where the manager can either
”save” earnings for the future and take the ”big bath”, i.e. m = m = mmin,
or ”borrow” earnings from the future, i.e. m = m = mmax. If the manager
decides to follow one of these strategies, her reporting would be revealing since
Dt 6= Dt in the sense that the analysts would be able to detect the manipulation
and adjust their beliefs accordingly.
Theorem 3 (SBGR reporting). If condition (35) does not hold, we obtain
the following revealing equilibria:
For θ ∈ [0, 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p) )
m∗ = m = mmax,
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmax,
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmax,
P
∗
t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax) + v(x− px− (1− p)x),
P ∗t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax) + v(x− px− (1− p)x),
P
∗
t+1 = x−mmax + v(x− px+ (1− p)x),
P ∗t+1 = x−mmax + v(x− px+ (1− p)x)
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian equi-
librium (in pure strategies).
For θ ∈ ( (1+β)(1+β)(1+δ)+δp(1−β) , 1]
m∗ = m = mmin,
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmin,
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin,
P
∗
t = x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin) + v(x− px− (1− p)x),
P ∗t = x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin) + v(x− px− (1− p)x),
P
∗
t+1 = x−mmin + v(x− px+ (1− p)x),
P ∗t+1 = x−mmin + v(x− px+ (1− p)x)
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian equi-
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librium (in pure strategies).
The results in the last two theorems show that the optimal reporting strategy
of the manager depends strongly on her time preferences θ as a function of the
time value of money δ, the distribution of true earnings p and the loss aversion
of the investors β. If the manager is interested in selling shares in the current
and in the following period, she has incentives to meet the analysts’ forecasts
in the current period as proved in the non–revealing equilibrium in Theorem
2. However, if the manager desires to sell more shares in the current period
for example, she would ”borrow” earnings from the future independently on
the state of ”true” earnings. In equilibrium, the analysts would adjust their
consensus forecasts up by the amount of the revenues the manager is able to
shift over time, i.e. mmax. This action of the analysts eliminates the price
impact of the manipulation but the manager would still do it. This is because
any other strategy is associated with a lower payoff for the manager given the
forecasts of the analysts and the time preferences of the manager to sell more
shares in the current period, so that in equilibrium the manager manipulates
the earnings up as expected by the analysts.
The same intuition applies in the case where the manager is more interested
in selling shares in period t+1. In this case, the manager would ”save” earnings
in the current period, i.e. take the ”big bath” in order to increase the price of
the firm in the period when she plan to sell her shares. Again, in equilibrium
the analysts expect this and adjust their forecasts so that the manager does
not get any premium for manipulating the earnings. Nevertheless, the manager
would not deviate from this strategy since any other strategy is associated with
a lower payoff given her time preferences and the forecasts of the analysts.
To derive more general conclusions on the importance of the market con-
ditions for the manager’s incentives to manipulate earnings, assume that there
are many managers with equally distributed time preferences θ. Then, we can
conclude based on the previous analysis that the absolute level of manipulation
in the economy is lower if the investors consider the analysts’ forecasts as a
reference point. This results follows from the fact that in equilibrium where
β > 1 there are some managers playing the non–revealing equilibrium (SBGR),
where the absolute level of manipulation is per definition lower compared to
the upper and lower bounds of manipulation, chosen by the managers in the
revealing equilibrium where there is no premium (discount) for meeting (falling
short of) the investors’ expectations (SBGR). This is illustrated graphically in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of Managers Holding Shares and
Playing with Behavioral and Non–Behavioral Investors
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager holding
shares (S), providing no guidance (G) under different market conditions (B
and B) in dependence on her time preferences θ. The points A = 1
1+δ
, B =
2
2+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p) , and C =
1+β
(1+β)(1+δ)+δp(1−β) represent bounds for the time
preferences θ for which the manipulation strategies are part of a revealing (R)
or non–revealing (R) equilibrium proved in Theorem 1, 2 and 3.
4.2 Optimal Reporting of a Manager Holding Stock Op-
tions
If the manager’s compensation package includes stock options instead of shares
her optimal reporting strategy changes since the manager’s payoff becomes a
non–linear function of the price of firm’s shares. To analyze the manager’s
incentive to manipulate earnings, we define θ is the percentage of stock options
that the manager desires to carry over to period t + 1. Hence, 1 − θ is the
percentage of options that the manager is allowed to exercise in period t.
Let Ct be the market value of a stock option with a strike equal to the mean
”true” earnings, px+ (1− p)x, which is denoted by X. In particular,
Ct = max(P t −X, 0) Ct = max(P t −X, 0)
Ct+1 = max(P t+1 −X, 0) Ct+1 = max(P t+1 −X, 0) (16)
where P t and P t are determined by (10) respectively (12) and P t+1 and P t+1
are determined by (11) respectively (13).
Again, in dependence on whether the analysts are in their role as target set-
ters or not, we distinguish two (revealing) equilibria. The first one summarizes
the players’ strategies in equilibrium when the analysts are only information
providers i.e. if investors do not pay a premium (or require a discount) for
meeting (falling short of) the consensus forecast, i.e. v(.) = 0. The second
one summarizes the players’ strategies in equilibrium when the analysts are also
target setters, i.e. v(.) 6= 0.
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Theorem 4 (CBGR reporting). If the manager holds stock options and
v(.) = 0 we obtain the following equilibrium
For θ ∈ ( 22+δ ; 1]
m∗ = m∗ = mmin
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmin
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin
C
∗
t = C
∗
t = 0
C
∗
t+1 = x−mmin −X
C∗t+1 = x−mmin −X
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian equi-
librium (in pure strategies).
For θ ∈ [0, 2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) ) and δ < 2(1−p)3−2p
m∗ = m∗ = mmax
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmax
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmax
C
∗
t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)−X
C∗t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)−X
C
∗
t+1 = 0
C∗t+1 = 0
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian equi-
librium (in pure strategies).
To get an intuition on this result particularly in the context of the previous,
recall that the manager’s best strategy is to report truthfully if she holds shares,
the time value of money is equal to zero and the manager is indifferent between
selling shares in period t or in period t+ 1 (see Theorem 1). Such indifference
cannot make the no–manipulation strategy attractive for the manager holding
stock options because her options become worthless if the next period ”true”
earnings are low and there is no earnings manipulation pushing the price up.
Hence, if the manager is compensated with stock options, she will never prefer
to report truthfully in equilibrium.
Comparing the optimal manipulation strategies of the manager in depen-
dence on her compensation package, we can also conclude that there will be
less manipulation in absolute terms in the economy if the managers in the econ-
omy are compensated with options instead of shares. The reason for this is
that options may become worthless whereas the stock price may fall below the
fundamentals but it cannot become negative. Thus, the revealing manipulation
strategies m = m = mmin and m = m = mmax are attractive only for the
manager with time preferences θ that are shifted toward the period where the
payoff is positive. More precisely, if the manager’s payoff is positive in period
t + 1 but equal to zero in period t, the manager would prefer to sell in period
t+ 1. Such preferences are reflected in a higher restriction on the parameter θ
for a given manipulation strategy to be optimal. For example, if we compare the
restriction on θ for the equilibrium strategym = m = mmin, we can see that the
manager holding shares follows this strategy if her time preference parameter θ
is lower than the time preference parameter θ of the manager holding stock op-
tions, i.e. 11+δ <
2
2+δ (see Theorem 1 and 4). This means that the latter follows
the manipulation strategy mmin if she prefers to exercise her options in period
t+ 1 instead of period t which is consistent with the observation that with the
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strategy mmin, Ct = Ct = 0 but P t > 0 and P t > 0. In other words, because
the manager holding stock options carries the risk to get nothing for her stock
options in the current period, she would follow the strategy m = m = mmin
only if her time preferences are such that she can exercise more options in t+1
with Ct+1 > 0 and Ct+1 > 0 than in t with Ct = Ct = 0 compared to the
manager holding shares where Pt > 0 and Pt+1 > 0.
Similar considerations apply when we compare the manager’s incentives to
manipulate earnings in dependence on her compensation package for the case
where the manager chooses to play m = m = mmax. Since with this strategy
Ct+1 = Ct+1 = 0 but P t+1 > 0 and P t+1 > 0, the manager holding stock
options would follow the strategy only if she has stronger incentives to exercise
them in the current period compared to the manager holding stocks. In partic-
ular, the strategy is optimal for a manager holding options if she has a lower θ
than a manager holding shares, i.e. 2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) <
1
1+δ (see Theorem 1 and
4). This is equivalent to the conclusion that the absolute level of manipulation
in the economy is lower if the managers in that economy are compensated with
options instead of shares.
Having derived conclusions on the implications of the manager’s compen-
sation on her manipulation strategies in equilibrium, we continue the analysis
by considering the impact of the market conditions in the case that manager
is compensated with stock options. In particular, we are interested how the
optimal manipulation strategy of the manager holding stock options changes if
investors are behavioral, i.e. if they use the analysts’ forecasts as a reference
point when evaluating earnings reports. In the previous analysis focusing on a
manager holding shares we have shown that a manager interested to sell shares
in both periods prefers to manipulate the earnings in order to meet the ana-
lysts’ forecasts. In the following, we analyze the existence of this non–revealing
equilibrium for the case that the manager holds stock options.
Theorem 5 (CBGR reporting). If the manager holds stock options and
θ ∈ [ 44+3δp−2δp2 , 1] then
m∗ = m∗ = mmin,
Ft = px+ (1− p)x+mmin,
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin,
C
∗
t = x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin) + x− px− (1− p)x−X,
C∗t = 0,
Ct+1 = x−mminx− px− (1− p)x−X,
Ct+1 = 0
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian equi-
librium (in pure strategies).
If investors are behavioral and the manager holds stock options instead of
shares then the no–manipulation strategy and the strategy of manipulating
earnings in order to meet the analysts’ forecasts are dominated strategies from
the manager’s point of view. Thus, in equilibrium the manager’s manipulation
strategy is revealing.
To compare the absolute levels of manipulation in the economy with be-
havioral and non–behavioral investors, we assume that δ > 2p−22p−3 so that the
strategy m = m = mmax is not an equilibrium strategy for the manager holding
20
shares and playing with non–behavioral investors (see Theorem 4).2 Since the
restriction on θ for the strategy m = m = mmin to be optimal for the manager
playing with non–behavioral investors, i.e. θ > 22+δ (see Theorem 4), is lower
than the restriction on θ for the manager playing with behavioral investors, i.e.
θ > 44+3δp−2δp (see Theorem 5) for all 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, we may con-
clude that there will be less manipulation in the economy in absolute terms if
the managers in that economy holding stock options play with behavioral than
with non–behavioral investors (see Figure 2). In other words, the fact that the
managers holding stock options play the earnings game with investors consid-
ering the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point does not increase the absolute
level of manipulation in the economy compared to the case with non–behavioral
investors.
Figure 2: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of a Manager Holding Stock Options
and Playing with Behavioral and Non–Behavioral Investors
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager hold-
ing stock options (C), providing no guidance (G) under different market con-
ditions (B and B) in dependence on her time preferences θ. The points
D =
2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)
2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) , E =
2
2+δ
, and F = 4
4+3δp−2δp2 represent bounds for
the time preferences θ for which the manipulation strategies are part of the
revealing (R) equilibria proved in Theorem 4 and 5.
4.3 Optimal Reporting of a Manager Guiding Analysts
Having analyzed the earnings game with a manager endowed with discretion to
manipulate the reported earnings numbers in dependence on the market con-
ditions and her compensation package, in this section we focus on the earnings
game with a manager providing earnings guidance to analysts. Studying the
manager’s incentives to manipulate earnings, we aim to answer the question
whether the absolute level of earnings manipulation increase when managers
provide guidance compared to the no–guidance case.
2This is a realistic assumption, since in the extreme case where p = 0 the requirement is
that δ > 2/3 which correspond to a maximum interest rate of 50%. The higher the probability
p the less binding is the restriction on δ.
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To answer this question we consider first an economy with non–behavioral
investors and a manager holding shares. If the manager provides earnings guid-
ance, she indirectly announce how she is planning to shift earnings over time.
Analysts aiming to minimize the mean squared forecast errors would adjust
their estimates according to the provided guidance. The manager considers
the best response of the analysts, i.e. how they will respond to the announced
guidance, and then she picks a manipulation strategy that is a best response to
the predicted response of the analysts. In equilibrium, the analysts adjust their
forecasts with the expected manipulation as a response.
The following theorem formalizes the guidance effect on the manipulation
decision of the manager holding shares under the assumption that investors do
not use the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point, i.e. v(.) = 0.
Theorem 6 (SBGR reporting). If the manager guides the analysts and v(.) =
0, we obtain the following equilibria:
For θ ∈ [0; 1− δ],
m∗ = m = mmax,
F ∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmax,
P
∗
t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax),
P ∗t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax),
P
∗
t+1 = x−mmax,
P ∗t+1 = x−mmax
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies).
For θ = 11+δ ,
m∗ = m = 0,
F ∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x,
P
∗
t = x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x),
P ∗t = x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x),
P
∗
t+1 = x,
P ∗t+1 = x
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies).
For θ ∈ (1− δ, 1] \ 11+δ ,
m∗ = m = mmin,
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmin,
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin,
P
∗
t = x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin),
P ∗t = x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin),
P
∗
t+1 = x−mmin,
P ∗t+1 = x−mmin
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies).
If the manager guides the analysts she has incentives to ”save” earnings for
the future, unless θ < 1 − δ. This is because any earnings manipulation in the
current period is almost ”undone” by the analysts, so that the only price impact
the manager is able to achieve with the earnings manipulation is in period t+1,
when the game ends. If δ = 1, i.e. if manipulation is completely ”undone” by the
analysts, every manager would follow this strategy independently on her time
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preferences. In contrast, if the manager does not provide any guidance to the
analysts with respect to the earnings she is planing to report, the manager with
time preferences θ < 11+δ would choose to ”borrow” earnings from the future,
i.e. m = m = mmax as proved in Theorem 1. Both strategies are illustrated in
Figure 3.
Figure 3: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of a Manager Holding Shares with
Guidance and No–Guidance
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager hold-
ing shares (S), providing guidance (G) or not (G) in dependence on her time
preferences θ. The points G = 1− δ and A = 1
1+δ
represent bounds for the time
preferences θ for which the manipulation strategies are part of the revealing (R)
equilibria proved in Theorem 1 and 6.
To make the difference in the manipulation policy of the manager more
intuitive, assume that the time value of money is equal to zero, i.e. δ = 1. Then,
the manager selling more shares in period t, i.e. θ < 12 , would manage earnings
up, i.e. m = m = mmax if she does not guide. The same manager would follow
a different strategy if she guides the analysts. This manager would anticipate
that the analysts’ reaction offsets the price effect of the earnings manipulation
in the current period and decide to ”save” earnings, i.e. m = m = mmin for
the future instead. In both cases the manager would report truthfully if she is
indifferent between selling shares in the current and the last period, i.e. θ = 12 .
Overall, if the manager holdings shares provides guidance to the analysts,
the absolute level of manipulation in the economy does not change. The effect
of guidance limits to more ”big baths” compared to the case where the manager
does not communicate her reporting plans.
In the following, we analyze the effect of guidance on the absolute level of
manipulation and the number of ”big baths” in the economy if the managers in
that economy hold stock options instead of shares.
Theorem 7 (CBGR reporting). If the manager holds stock options, v(.) = 0,
and guides the analysts we obtain the following equilibria.
For θ ∈ [ (2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX(2−p)(x−x)+δX ; 1]
m∗ = m∗ = mmin
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F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmin
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin
C
∗
t = C
∗
t = 0
C
∗
t+1 = x−mmin −X
C∗t+1 = x−mmin −X
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian equi-
librium (in pure strategies).
For θ ∈ [0, 2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) ] and δ < 2p−22p−3
m∗ = m∗ = mmax
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+mmax
F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmax
C
∗
t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)−X
C∗t = x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)−X
C
∗
t+1 = C
∗
t+1 = 0
and the posterior beliefs of the analysts µ ∈ [0, 1] is a revealing Bayesian equi-
librium (in pure strategies).
Given that the analysts predict that the manager does not manipulate the
earnings, it is never optimal for the manager to do so, when she holds stock
options instead of shares. Thus, in equilibrium, the analysts would change
their beliefs, which again influence the present value of the firm’s earnings.
The manager anticipates that any manipulation is almost ”undone” in period t
and would ”save” earnings for the the future if she has stronger preferences to
exercise options in period t+1 compared to the case when she does not provide
any guidance.
Therefore, in the case where the managers in the economy hold stock options
their decision to guide the analysts has two effects. First, there will be more
managers taking the ”big bath” compared to the case with no guidance. Second,
the absolute level of manipulation in the economy would increase. Both effects
are illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of a Manager Holding Stock Options
with Guidance and No–Guidance
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager holding
stock options (C), providing guidance (G) or not (G) in dependence on her time
preferences θ. The points E = 2
2+δ
andH =
(2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX
(2−p)(x−x)1δX represent bounds
for the time preferences θ for which the manipulation strategies are part of the
revealing (R) equilibria proved in Theorem 1 and 6.
Having derived conclusions on the effect of guidance on the number of ”big
baths” and the absolute level of manipulation in the economy, we focus now
on the effect of managers’ compensation when the managers in that economy
guide. We have already seen that the absolute level of manipulation in the
economy is lower if the managers providing no guidance are compensated with
shares than with stock options. The same conclusion holds also for managers
providing guidance. The absolute level of manipulation is lower if the managers
are compensated with stock options than with shares, since 2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) <
1− δ < (2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX(2−p)(x−x)1δX (see Theorem 6 and 7). Figure 5 illustrates the effect
graphically.
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Figure 5: Optimal Manipulation Strategies of a Manager Providing Guidance
and Holding Shares or Stock Options
The figure summarizes the optimal manipulation strategies of a manager holding
shares (S) or stock options (C) and providing guidance (G) in dependence on her
time preferences θ. The points A = 1
1+δ
, D =
2(1−p)+δ(2p−3)
2(1−p)+δ(2p−1) , G = 1 − δ, and
H =
(2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX
(2−p)(x−x)1δX represent bounds for the time preferences θ for which
the manipulation strategies are part of the revealing (R) equilibria proved in
Theorem 6 and 7.
5 Conclusions
The question whether and why managers manipulate earnings has been one
of the main research issues in several empirical and theoretical papers lately.
Their main point is that the managers’ manipulation decisions are basically
motivated by the investors’ response to earnings reports. This raises the ques-
tion whether the managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings change if firm’s
outsiders behave strategically when observing the managers’ reporting decisions
and determine the price of the firm’s shares.
To analyze this problem we consider a three–period economy with one man-
ager, investors and analysts that interact strategically. The main objective of
our model is to support to derive conclusions on how the market conditions, the
manager’s compensation package and the manager’s guidance to analysts affect
the manager’s incentives to manipulate earnings and ultimately the absolute
level of manipulation in the whole economy. Based on the analytical results, we
can derive the following conclusions.
When evaluating the relevance of the market conditions we distinguish two
cases. The first one is the case where investors consider analysts only as
providers of information regarding the next period earnings that the manager
is reporting. The second one is the case where investors are behavioral, i.e.
they consider the analysts’ forecasts as a reference point when evaluating the
earnings reported by the manager. Our results show that whatever the compen-
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sation package of the managers, the fact that the managers play the earnings
game with behavioral investors does not increase the absolute level of manipu-
lation in the economy. The reason is that in the case of behavioral investors and
managers holding shares, some managers would choose to manipulate the earn-
ings in order to meet the analysts’ forecasts. This manipulation is per definition
lower than the minimum and maximum bounds of manipulation representing
earnings reserves that managers can shift over time. In contrast, if the managers
in the economy hold stock options, they would not choose to meet the analysts’
forecasts in equilibrium. Instead, they would prefer to shift all there earnings re-
serves over time. Since this strategy is optimal for less managers when investors
are behavioral compared to the case with non–behavioral investors, we can con-
clude that the loss aversion of the investors does not motivate more managers
to shift their earnings reserves over time. In other words, the absolute level of
manipulation decreases if managers holding shares instead of stock options play
the earnings game with investors who are additionally averse against earnings
reports below the consensus forecast.
When assessing the impact of the managers’ compensation, we consider a
manager holding either shares or stock options. Independent on whether the in-
vestors are behavioral or not, the absolute level of manipulation in the economy
is lower if the managers in the economy hold stock options than shares. The
same conclusion holds also if the managers in the economy provide guidance to
analysts and investors are non–behavioral.
The impact of guidance is studied in an economy with managers holding
shares and stock options. Independently on their compensation package, there
are more managers taking the ”big bath” if they guide the analysts compared
to the case with no guidance. Since this does not influence the overall level of
manipulation in the economy when managers hold stocks, there will be more
manipulation if managers hold stock options and guide the analysts compared
to the case with no–guidance.
Overall, if regulators aim to reduce the absolute level of manipulation in an
economy, they should not try to motivate investors to focus only on the present
value of earnings. Instead, they should support the investors’ view that earn-
ings reports should be additionally evaluated relative to the consensus forecast,
and managers reporting earnings below it, should be punished by a stronger
price decline compared to managers beating the consensus by the same amount.
When evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of managers’ compensation
packages, regulators should also support managers compensation plan based on
stock options instead of shares. Ultimately, if the managers in the economy
are compensated with stock options earnings guidance should be abolished by
regulators since this increases the absolute level of manipulation in the economy.
Our model can be extended in several aspects. First, it would be interesting
to see how the results change if we consider a strategic game without a final
period. Second, it might be relevant to observe how the managers’ incentives
to manipulate earnings change if investors behave strategically as well. Finally,
introducing other firms competing for the investors’ attention may also have
interesting implications for the manipulation behavior of the managers in an
economy with behavioral investors.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The optimal forecasts of the analysts given their payoff function (7) are:
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+ pn∗ + (1− p)n∗ (17)
and
F ∗t+1 = px+ (1− p)x− µn∗ − (1− µ)n∗ (18)
Then, the manager’s payoff given that xt = x is:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1−p)x)−δn]+δθp(x−m)+δθ(1−p)(x−m) (19)
and given that xt = x is:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1−p)x)−δn]+δθp(x−m)+δθ(1−p)8x−m) (20)
Since the manager’s payoff is increasing inm respectivelym, the manager would
choose the extreme strategies m = m = mmax (respectively m = m = mmin). If
the manager is indifferent between manipulating earnings or truthful reporting,
we assume that she chooses m = m = 0.
Comparing the manager’s payoff associated with the different strategies we
get that the manager’s payoff is maximal if
m = m = mmax > 0 and θ <
1
1 + δ
(21)
or
m = m = mmin < 0 and θ >
1
1 + δ
(22)
If θ = 11+δ , the manager is indifferent between manipulating the earnings and
truthful reporting. The analysts’ beliefs are correct and given these beliefs the
manager does not have incentives to follow a different strategy, i.e. m = n =
m = n = 0.
If the manager prefers to manipulate the earnings, the analysts adjust their
beliefs accordingly, so that in equilibrium m = m = n = n = mmin respectively
m = m = n = n = mmax for any µ ∈ [0, 1]. If for example n = n = mmax, the
manager’s payoffs in both states are:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1−p)x−mmax)]+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1−p)[x−m] (23)
respectively
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1−p)x−mmax)]+δθp(x−m)+δθ(1−p)(x−m)
(24)
Then, the manager would compare her payoffs from different manipulation
strategies m ∈ [mmin,mmax] and would choose the strategy delivering the max-
imum payoff. If the analysts choose n = n = mmax the manager’s payoff is
maximal if she plays m = m = mmax given that θ < 11+δ . Similarly, the man-
ager’s payoff from following the strategy m = m = mmin given that the analysts
choose n = n = mmin is maximal if θ > 11+δ . If θ =
1
1+δ , the manager is in-
different between manipulating earnings and truthful reporting and she chooses
m = m = 0.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that in this equilibrium the best response of the analysts is F ∗t =
F ∗t+1 = px+ (1− p)x. Later on, we are proving this claim.
Given the beliefs of the analysts, the payoffs of the manager in both states
are:
uM (.) = (1− θ)[x+m+ δ(px+ (1− p)x) + v(x+m− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x)] (25)
respectively
uM (.) = (1− θ)[x+m+ δ(px+ (1− p)x) + v(x+m− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x)] (26)
Now, we consider different levels of manipulation for which the marginal utility
change and compare the manager’s payoffs associated with them. For F ∗t =
F ∗t+1 = px+ (1− p)x the manipulation decisions changing the marginal utility
of manipulation are:
m1 = mmin (27)
m2 = x− px− (1− p)x = −p(x− x)
m3 = px+ (1− p)x− x = −(1− p)(x− x)
m4 = 0
m5 = x− px− (1− p)x = (1− p)(x− x)
m6 = mmax
respectively
m1 = mmin (28)
m2 = x− px− (1− p)x = −p(x− x)
m3 = 0
m4 = x− px− (1− p)x = (1− p)(x− x)
m5 = px− (1− p)x− x = p(x− x)
m6 = mmax
Thus, to prove that the manipulation strategies m3 = −(1 − p)(x − x) and
m5 = p(x − x) are the best given that F ∗t = F ∗t+1 = px + (1 − p)x we need
to prove that the manager cannot increase her payoff by following a different
strategy given the beliefs of the analysts. To define the conditions for which
this is true, we compare the manager’s payoffs associated with the different
manipulation strategies.
Consider first the case where xt = x. Then, the manager’s payoffs associated
with the manipulation strategies changing the marginal utility of manipulation
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in this state are:
uM1 (m = mmin) = (1− θ)[x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+β(x+mmin − px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp(x−mmin + x−mmin − px− (1− p)x)
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin + x−mmin − px− (1− p)x]
(29)
uM2 (m = −p(x− x)) = (1− θ)[x− p(x− x) + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+β(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp(x+ p(x− x) + x+ p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)
+δθ(1− p)(x+ p(x− x))
(30)
uM3 (m = −(1− p)(x− x)) = (1− θ)[x− (1− p)(x− x) + δ(px+ (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x+ (1− p)(x− x)
+x+ (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x]
+δθ(1− p)[x+ (1− p)(x− x)
+β(x+ (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
(31)
uM4 (m = 0) = (1− θ)[x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x) + x− px− (1− p)x]
+δθp[x+ x− px− (1− p)x]
+δθ(1− p)[x+ β(x− px− (1− p)x)]
(32)
uM5 (m = (1− p)(x− x)) = (1− θ)[x+ (1− p)(x− x) + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+x+ (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x]
+δθp[x− (1− p)(x− x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x− (1− p)(x− x)
+β(x− (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
(33)
uM6 (m = mmax) = (1− θ)[x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+x+mmax − px− (1− p)x]
+δθp[x−mmax + β(x−mmax − px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax + β(x−mmax − px− (1− p)x)]
(34)
The strategy m3 = −(1− p)(x− x) is optimal for the managers if (31) is larger
than (29), (30), (32), (33) and (34). We derive conditions on θ depending on the
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parameters p, δ and β for which this is true. These conditions are illustrated in
Figure 6 as manifolds under the assumption that δ = 0.95 and mmax = 2x.
Figure 6: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x
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The two-dimensional manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which
certain payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters under the top manifold are
such that (31) is greater than (29). The subset of parameters under the middle
manifold are such that (31) is greater than (30). The subset of parameters above
the lowest manifold are such that (31) is greater than (32), (33) and (34).
Thus, the upper bound of the parameter θ is determined by the condition
that (31) is lower than (30) and the lower bound of the parameter θ is deter-
mined by the condition that (31) is greater than (32). This is equivalent to the
condition
2
2 + δ(1 + p) + δβ(1− p) ≤ θ ≤
1 + β
(1 + β)(1 + δ) + δp(1− β) (35)
Consider next the case, where xt = x. Then, the manager’s payoffs associ-
ated with the manipulation strategies in this state are:
uM1 (m = mmin) = (1− θ)[x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+β(x+mmin − px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp(x−mmin + x−mmin − px− (1− p)x)
+δθ(1− p)(x−mmin + x−mmin − px− (1− p)x)
(36)
uM2 (m = −p(x− x)) = (1− θ)[x− p(x− x) + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+β(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x+ p(x− x) + x+ p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x]
+δθ(1− p)[x+ p(x− x)]
(37)
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uM3 (m = 0) = (1− θ)[x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x) + β(x− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp(x+ x− px− (1− p)x)
+δθ(1− p)[x+ β(x− px− (1− p)x)]
(38)
uM4 (m = (1− p)(x− x)) = (1− θ)[x+ (1− p)(x− x) + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+β(x+ (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθp[x− (1− p)(x− x) + x]
+δθ(1− p)[x− (1− p)(x− x)
+β(x− (1− p)(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
(39)
uM5 (m = p(x− x)) = (1− θ)[x+ p(x− x) + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+δθp[x− p(x− x) + β(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x− p(x− x) + β(x− p(x− x)− px− (1− p)x)]
(40)
uM6 (m = mmax) = (1− θ)[x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x)
+x+mmax − px− (1− p)x]
+δθp[x−mmax + β(x−mmax − px− (1− p)x)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax + x−mmax − px− (1− p)x]
(41)
The strategy m5 = p(x−x) is optimal for the manager if (40) is larger than
(36), (37), (38), (39) and (41). We derive conditions on θ depending on the
parameters p, δ and β for which this is true. These conditions are illustrated in
Figure 7 as manifolds under the assumption that δ = 0.95 and mmax = 2x.
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Figure 7: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x
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The two-dimensional manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which
certain payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters under the top manifold are
such that (40) is greater than (36). The subset of parameters under the middle
manifold are such that (40) is greater than (37), (38) and (39). The subset of
parameters above the lowest manifold are such that (40) is greater than (41).
Thus, the strategy m5 = p(x−x) is optimal for the manager if (40) is larger
than (38) and (41). This is true for
−2(mmax − p(x− x))
2p+ δp(1 + β)−mmax(2 + δ(1 + β)) ≤ θ ≤
1
1 + δ
(42)
If mmax = x− x for example, then the condition is equivalent to:
2
2 + δ(1 + β)
≤ θ ≤ 1
1 + δ
(43)
Comparing the conditions (35) and (43), one can see that the lower bound
for the parameter θ is determined by condition (35) and the upper bound for
the parameter θ is determined by condition (43) so that for 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p) ≤
θ ≤ 11+δ the best strategy of the manager is to cover the consensus forecast,
which is equal to the mean of the ”true” earnings in this equilibrium.
Note that this strategy is optimal only if investors are loss averse. For β ≤ 1
the conditions (35) and (43) are empty and the non–revealing equilibrium where
the manager manipulates earnings to meet the consensus forecast would not
exist.
Finally, we prove that given the best response of the manager, the best fore-
casts of the analysts is Ft = F t+1 = F t+1 = px+(1−p)x. The optimal forecasts
of the analysts given their payoff function (7) and the optimal manipulation de-
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cision of the manager are:
F ∗t = F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+ (1− p)x+ p(1− p)(x− x) + (1− p)p(x− x)(44)
= px+ (1− p)x
since in this equilibrium µ = p.
The optimal reporting strategy of the manager given that Ft = Ft+1 =
px+ (1− p)x is summarized graphically using a numerical example with x = 1,
x = −1, p = 0.6, δ = 0.95.
Figure 8: Optimal Reporting if xt = x and xt = x
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The figure summarizes the optimal reported earnings ”D up” equal toDt = x+m
and ”D down” equal to Dt = x+m given that Ft = Ft+1 = px+ (1− p)x. The
manager’s optimal reporting is calculated for x = 1, x = −1, β = 5, p = 0.6,
δ = 0.95.
As one can easily see, the optimal manipulation strategy where Dt = Dt
results only for particular values of θ. the upper and lower bound for θ are
calculated above. For other values of θ Dt is not equal to Dt, so that the
reporting is revealing in the sense that the analysts would adjust their beliefs
in equilibrium. The chosen reporting might not be optimal anymore.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose that in the first equilibrium the best response of the analysts is Ft =
px+ (1− p)x+mmax and F t+1 = F t+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmax. later on, we
are proving this claim.
Given the beliefs of the analysts, the manager’s payoffs are:
uM (.) = (1− θ)[x+m+ δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax) + v(x+m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
+δθp[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)] (45)
respectively
uM (.) = (1− θ)[x+m+ δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax) + v(x+m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
+δθp[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−m+ v(x−m− px− (1− p)x+mmax)] (46)
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Now, we consider different levels of manipulation for which the marginal utility
of manipulation changes and compare the manager’s payoff associated with
them. Given the analysts’ forecasts representing the reference point in the
function v(.) the feasible manipulation levels m ∈ [mmin,mmax] for which the
marginal utility of manipulation changes are:
m = mmax − x+ px+ (1− p)x (47)
m = mmax + x− px− (1− p)x
m = mmax + x− px− (1− p)x
Note that given the analysts’ forecasts, the manager is able to meet them in
the current period only if xt = x. If xt = x, the manipulation required to meet
the consensus forecast is not feasible since we assume that m ∈ [mmin,mmax].
Overall, the manager can chose among the following strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = 0
m3 = mmax + x− px− (1− p)x
m4 = mmax − x+ px+ (1− p)x
m5 = mmax
respectively
m1 = mmin
m2 = 0
m3 = mmax + x− px− (1− p)x
m4 = mmax
Consider first the case where xt = x. The manager’s payoffs associated with
the manipulation strategies listed above are as follows.
uM1 (.) = (1− θ)[x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)
+β(x+mmin − px− (1− p)x−mmax)]
+δθp[x−mmin + x−mmin − px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin + x−mmin − px− (1− p)x+mmax](48)
uM2 (.) = (1− θ)[x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)
+β(x− px− (1− p)x−mmax)]
+δθp[x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmax] (49)
uM3 (.) = (1− θ)[x+mmax + x− px− (1− p)x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)
+β(x+mmax + x− px− (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x−mmax)]
+δθp[x−mmax − x+ px+ (1− p)x
+x−mmax − x+ px+ (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax − x+ px+ (1− p)x] (50)
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uM4 (.) = (1− θ)[x+mmax − x+ px+ (1− p)x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)]
+δθp[x−mmax + x− px− (1− p)x
+x−mmax + x− px− (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax + x− px− (1− p)x (51)
+β(x−mmax + x− px− (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x+mmax)]
uM5 (.) = (1− θ)[x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmax)
+x+mmax − px− (1− p)x−mmax]
+δθp[x−mmax + x−mmax − px− (1− p)x+mmax]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax + β(x−mmax − px− (1− p)x+mmax)](52)
The strategy m5 = mmax is optimal for the manager if (52) is larger than (48),
(49), (50) and (51). We derive conditions on θ depending on the parameters p,
δ and β for which this is true and represent them as manifolds in the following
figure.
Figure 9: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x
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The two-dimensional manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which
certain payoffs are equal. The subset of parameters under the top manifold is
such that (52) is larger than (50). The subset of parameters under the next two
manifolds is such that (52) is larger than (48) respectively (49). The subset of
parameters under the last manifold is such that (52) is larger than (51).
As one can easily see in the figure above only condition (51) is binding so
that the upper bound is determined by the condition that (52) is larger than
(51). This is true for θ ∈ [0, 22+δ(1+p)+δβ(1−p) ).
38
The condition on θ for which the manager follows m = mmax achieve the
highest utility is not binding.
Suppose now that the best forecasts of the analysts in the second equilibrium
are F ∗t = px+(1−p)x+mmin and F
∗
t+1 = F
∗
t+1 = px+(1−p)x−mmin. Later
on, we are proving this.
Given the analysts’ forecasts, the manager can chose between the following
strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = mmin + x− px− (1− p)x
m3 = mmin − x+ px+ (1− p)x
m4 = 0
m5 = mmax
respectively
m1 = mmin
m2 = mmin + x− px− (1− p)x
m3 = 0
m4 = mmax
Consider first the case where xt = x. The payoffs from following the strate-
gies m1 to m5 are the following:
uM1 (.) = (1− θ)[x+mmin + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin)
+β(x+mmin − px− (1− p)x−mmin)]
+δθp[x−mmin + x−mmin − px− (1− p)x+mmin]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin + β(x−mmin − px− (1− p)x+mmin)](53)
uM2 (.) = (1− θ)[x+mmin + x− px− (1− p)x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin)
+β(x+mmin + x− px− (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x−mmin)]
+δθp[x−mmin − x+ px+ (1− p)x]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin − x+ px+ (1− p)x
+β(x−mmin − x+ px+ (1− p)x− px− (1− p)x+mmin)] (54)
uM3 (.) = (1− θ)[x+mmin − x+ px+ (1− p)x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin)]
+δθp[x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmin
+β(x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmin − px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−+x− px− (1− p)x+mmin
+β(x+ x− px− (1− p)x+mmin − px− (1− p)x+mmin)] (55)
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uM4 (.) = (1− θ)[x+ δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin)
+x− px− (1− p)x−mmin]
+δθp[x+ β(x− px− (1− p)x+mmin]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmin + β(x− px− (1− p)x+mmin)] (56)
uM5 (.) = (1− θ)[x+mmax + δ(px+ (1− p)x−mmin)
+x+mmax − px− (1− p)x−mmin]
+δθp[x−mmax + β(x−mmax − px− (1− p)x+mmin)]
+δθ(1− p)[x−mmax + β(x−mmax − px− (1− p)x+mmin)](57)
The strategy m = mmin is optimal for the manager, if the payoff (53) is
larger than the payoffs (54), (55), (56) and (57). We derive conditions on θ
depending on the parameters p, β and δ for which this is true and illustrate
them in the following figure.
Figure 10: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x
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The manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which certain payoffs are
equal. The subset of parameters above the lowest manifold is such that (53) is
larger than (57). The subset of parameters above the next two manifolds is such
that (53) is larger than (56) respectively (55). The subset of parameters above
the manifolds on the top is such that (53) is larger than (54).
As one can easily see in the figure above, the lower bound for the parameter
θ is determined by the condition that (53) is larger than (54), which is true for
θ ∈ ( 1+β(1+β)(1+δ)+δp(1−β) , 1].
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The manager’s payoff is maximal if she decides to manipulate earnings down
tom = mmin if (53) is larger than (54). If this condition is satisfied, the manager
would chose m = mmin.
Given the manager’s strategy m = m = mmin respectively m = m = mmax
the best response of the analysts minimizing the squared mean forecast error as
defined in (7) is:
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+ pn∗ + (1− p)n∗ = px+ (1− p)x+mmin (58)
respectively
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+ pn∗ + (1− p)n∗ = px+ (1− p)x+mmax (59)
and
F ∗t+1 = px+ (1− p)x+ µn∗ + (1− µ)n∗ = px+ (1− p)x−mmin (60)
respectively
F ∗t+1 = px+ (1− p)x+ µn∗ + (1− µ)n∗ = px+ (1− p)x−mmax (61)
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
If v(.) = 0, the manager’s payoffs in both states are:
uM (.) = (1− θ)max(x+m+ δFt+1 −X, 0)
+δθpmax(x−m−X, 0)
+δθ(1− p)max(x−m−X, 0) (62)
respectively
uM (.) = (1− θ)max(x+m+ δFt+1 −X, 0)
+δθpmax(x−m−X, 0)
+δθ(1− p)max(x−m−X, 0) (63)
where X := px+ (1− p)x.
Consider first the case xt = x where the manager aims to find some m ∈
[mmin,mmax] that maximizes (62) given Ft+1. Suppose that in this equilibrium
F ∗t+1 = X = px+ (1− p)x. Then, the manager’s marginal utility would change
when the manager switches between the following strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X
m3 = px+ (1− p)x− x
m4 = X − δ(x+ (1− p)x)− x
m5 = 0
m6 = x−X
m7 = mmax
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The value of the call options in period t and t+1 associated with these strategies
is given in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 δX 2(1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 0 2(1− p)(x− x) + δX 0
m5 (1− p)(x− x) + δX (1− p)(x− x) 0
m6 2(1− p)(x− x) + δX 0 0
m7 (1− p)(x− x) + δX +mmax 0 0
The strategies m3 and m5, which are consistent with the analysts’ ex-
pectations are both dominated strategies. Thus, given the analysts’ beliefs
Ft+1 = X = px+(1− p)x, the manager is always better off if she deviates from
the strategy consistent with these beliefs. In particular, the manager’s utility
is maximal if she follow either strategy m1 = mmin or strategy m7 = mmax in
dependance on the parameter of the utility function, i.e. δ and θ.
Consider next the case xt = x where the manager aims to find some m ∈
[mmin,mmax] that maximizes (63) given Ft+1 = X = px + (1 − p)x. Then,
the manager’s utility would change when the manager switches between the
following strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X
m3 = 0
m4 = x−X
m5 = X − δ(px+ (1− p)x)− x
m6 = px+ (1− p)x− x
m7 = mmax
The value of the call options in period t and t+1 associated with these strategies
is given in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 0 (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 0 0 0
m5 0 0 0
m6 δX 0 0
m7 −p(x− x) + δX +mmax 0 0
Thus, the strategies m6 and m3 consistent with the analysts’ beliefs are both
dominated strategies. Thus, given the analysts’ beliefs Ft+1 = X = px+(1−p)x,
the manager is always better if she deviate from the strategies consistent with
these beliefs. In particular, the manager’s utility is maximal if she follows either
strategy m1 = mmin or strategy m7 = mmax in dependance on the parameter
δ and θ.
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If the manager chooses to play m = m = mmin or m = m = mmax the
analysts would change their beliefs in equilibrium so that Ft+1 = px + (1 −
p)x−mmin respectively Ft+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmax.
Consider first the case where Ft+1 = px + (1 − p)x − mmin. This is an
equilibrium strategy if the manager prefers to play m = m = mmin to any other
strategy. In order to derive conditions for which this is true we evaluate the value
of the stock options in both periods associated with the different manipulation
strategies available to the manager given that Ft+1 = px + (1 − p)x − mmin.
The strategies available to the manager are:
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X
m3 = 0
m4 = x−X
m5 = mmax
respectively
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X
m3 = 0
m4 = x−X
m5 = mmax
The following table summarizes the value of the stock options in both periods
associated with these strategies.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 x−X +mmin + δ(X −mmin) (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 (1− 2p)(x− x) + δ(X −mmin) x− x 0
m3 x−X + δ(X −mmin) (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 2(1− p)(x− x) + δ(X −mmin) 0 0
m5 x−X +mmax + δ(X −mmin) 0 0
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 −p(x− x) + δ(X −mmin) (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 (1− 2p)(x− x) + δ(X −mmin) 0 0
m5 −p(x− x) +mmax + δ(X −mmin) 0 0
where X := px+ (1− p)x. The next figure illustrates for which parameters
θ, p, and δ the manager’s payoff is maximal if she choosees the strategy m1 =
mmin.
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Figure 11: Restrictions on θ satisfying the equilibrium conditions for the case
xt = x given that Ft+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin
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The manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which certain payoffs
are equal. The subset of parameters above the lowest manifold is such that
uM (m1) > uM (m2). The subset of parameters above the next two manifolds is
such that uM (m1) > uM (m3) and uM (m1) > uM (m4). The subset of parame-
ters above the manifolds on the top is such that uM (m1) > uM (m5).
Thus, given that Ft+1 = px+(1−p)x−mmin the manager choosesm = mmin
if uM (m1) > uM (m5), which is true for
θ >
2
2 + δ
(64)
If condition (64) holds, the manager would also choose m1 = mmin since
uM (m1) > u
M (m) for any p ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1]. This is illustrated in the
following figure.
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Figure 12: Restrictions on θ for which uM (m1) > uM (m5) and uM (m1) >
uM (m5) given that Ft+1 = px+ (1− p)x−mmin
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The manifolds determine the subsets of parameters for which certain payoffs are
equal. The subset of parameters above the lowest manifold is such that uM (m1)
is maximal. The subset of parameters above the manifolds on the top is such
that uM (m1) is maximal.
Consider now the case where Ft+1 = px+(1−p)x−mmax. The manager can
choose between the same manipulation strategies as in the case where Ft+1 =
px+ (1− p)x−mmin. The value of her stock options changes as follows.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 −p(x− x) + δ(X −mmax) (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 2(1− p)(x− x) + δ(X −mmax) 0 0
m5 (1− p)(x− x) + δ(X −mmax) +mmax 0 0
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 0 (1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 0 0 0
m5 −p(x− x) +mmax + δ(X −mmax) 0 0
for δ < 2(p−1)2p−3 .
Thus, the manager chooses m = mmax but also m = mmax if uM (m5) >
uM (m1). This is true for
θ <
2(1− p) + δ(2p− 3)
2(1− p) + δ(2p− 1) (65)
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
If v(.) 6= 0 the manager’s payoffs in both states are:
uM (.) = (1− θ)max[x+m+ δF t+1 + v(x+m− Ft)−X, 0]
δθpmax[x−m+ v(x−m− F t+1)−X, 0]
+δθ(1− p)max[x−m+ v(x−m− F t+1)−X, 0] (66)
and
uM (.) = (1− θ)max[x+m+ δF t+1 + v(x+m− Ft)−X, 0]
δθpmax[x−m+ v(x−m− F t+1)−X, 0]
+δθ(1− p)max[x−m+ v(x−m− F t+1)−X, 0] (67)
where the function v(.) is defined as in (3) and X := px+ (1− p)x as before.
Consider first the case where the manager aims to find somem ∈ [mmin,mmax]
that maximizes (66) given F t+1. Suppose that in equilibrium F
∗
t+1 = X =
px + (1 − p)x. Then, the manager’s marginal utility would change when the
manager switches between the following strategies:
m1 = mmin
m2 = x−X = −p(x− x)
m3 = X − x = −(1− p)(x− x)
m4 = 0
m5 = x−X = (1− p)(x− x)
m6 = mmax (68)
The value of the stock options in both periods associated with these strategies
are given in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 2(1− p)(x− x)− 2mmin −2p(x− x)− 2mmin
m2 0 x− x 0
m3 2(1− p)(x− x) + δX 2(1− p)(x− x) 0
m4 δX 3(1− p)(x− x) + x 0
m5 4(1− p)(x− x) + δX 0 0
m6 2(1− p)(x− x) + 2mmax + δX 0 0
Thus, given that Ft = F t+1 = X = px − +(1 − p)x for any θ ∈ [0, 1]
the strategies m3 and m4, which are consistent with the analysts’ forecasts
are dominated. Moreover, if the analysts forecasts are Ft = F t+1 = X =
px+ (1− p)x, the manager chooses either m1 = mmin or m6 = mmax. Thus, in
equilibrium the analysts would change their beliefs.
Suppose that the analysts best forecasts are Ft = X + mmin and F t+1 =
X −mmin. Then, the manager can choose among the following manipulation
strategies:
m1 = mmin (69)
m2 = x−X +mmin = (1− p)(x− x) +mmin
m3 = 0
m4 = mmax
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The value of the stock options in both periods associated with these strate-
gies is summarized in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 2(1− p)(x− x) + δX + (1− δ)mmin 2(1− p)(x− x)−mmin 0
m2 4(1− p)(x− x) + δX + (1− δ)mmin −mmin 0
m3 2(1− p)(x− x) + δX − (1 + δ)mmin 0 0
m4 2(1− p)(x− x) + δX − (3 + δ)mmin 0 0
The strategies m2 and m3 are dominated by m4 for any θ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
given Ft = X +mmin and F t+1 = X −mmin, the strategy m1 = mmin is an
equilibrium strategy if uM (m1) ≥ uM (m4). This is true for
θ ≥ 4
4 + 3δp− 2δp2 (70)
If xt = x the manager can choose among the following manipulation strate-
gies:
m1 = mmin (71)
m2 = x−X +mmin = (1− p)(x− x) +mmin
m3 = X − x+mmin = p(x− x) +mmin
m4 = 0
m5 = mmax
The value of the stock options in both periods associated with these strate-
gies is summarized in the following table.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 2(1− p)(x− x)−mmin 0
m2 0 −mmin 0
m3 δX + (1− δ)mmin 0 0
m4 δX − p(x− x)− (1 + δ)mmin 0 0
m5 δX − 2p(x− x) + (3 + δ)mmax 0 0
for β > 2(1−p)2p−1 .
The strategy m1 = mmin would be an equilibrium strategy of the manager
if uM (m1) is the maximum utility the manager can achieve given the forecasts
of the analysts. Since the strategies m4 and m3 are dominated by m5 and
the strategy m2 is dominated by m1 the strategy m1 is the best if u
M (m1) >
uM (m5) which is equivalent to θ >
Ct(m5)
δpCt+1(m1)+Ct(m5)
. Recall that the condition
(70) is equivalent to θ > Ct(m5)−Ct(m1)
δpCt+1(m1)+Ct(m5)−Ct(m1) . Thus, if (70) holds, the
condition θ > Ct(m5)
δpCt+1(m1)+Ct(m5)
would not be binding since Ct(m5) < Ct(m5).
Suppose now that the analysts’ best forecasts are F = px+(1− p)x+mmax
and Ft+1 = px+(1−p)x−mmax. This is an equilibrium strategy, if the manager
would playm = m = mmax. However, if investors are loss averse, i.e. β > 1, the
manager would never play m = mmax, since this is a dominated strategy. This
is because Ct(m = mmax) > 0 only if β <
(1−δ)(X−mmax)−x
x−X . This condition
is greater than 1 only if δ < mmax−2(X−xmmax−X , which is negative if we assume that
mmax = x− x. Thus, if investors are loss averse, i.e. β > 1, the manager would
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never choose to play m = mmax in equilibrium given that the analysts expect
them to do so. Thus, this strategy is not part of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6
The optimal forecasts of the guided analysts given their payoff function (7) with
n = m and n = m are:
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+ pm+ (1− p)m (72)
and
F ∗t+1 = px+ (1− p)x− µm− (1− µ)m (73)
Given the best response of the analysts to the manager providing guidance with
respect to the earnings she are about to shift over time, the manager’s payoff in
both states is:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1−p)x−µm−(1−µ)m)]+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1−p)[x−m]
(74)
respectively
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1−p)x−µm−(1−µ)m)]+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1−p)[x−m]
(75)
Since v(.) = 0 the manager’s payoff depends linearly on m respectively m
so that the manager would either choose to play mmax or mmin. If the man-
ager choses the same action in both states, i.e. m = m ∈ {mmin,mmax}, the
outsiders’ beliefs µ do not matter and the manager’s payoff is:
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1−p)x−m]+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1−p)[x−m] (76)
respectively
u(.)M = (1−θ)[x+m+δ(px+(1−p)x−m)]+δθp[x−m]+δθ(1−p)[x−m] (77)
where
The manager would therefore prefer to manipulate the earnings rather than
to report truthfully if either
θ < 1− δ and m = mmax > 0 (78)
or
θ > 1− δ and m = mmin < 0 (79)
If θ = 1−δ, the manager is indifferent between earnings manipulation and truth-
ful reporting. However, if the manager says that she is not going to manipulate
the earnings and the analysts expect them to do so, they have strong incentives
to deviate from the announced strategy. Thus, truthful reporting is not an equi-
librium strategy for the manager guiding the analysts. Hence, a manager with
θ = 1 − δ, would decide to manipulate earnings up, i.e. m = m = mmax, since
1 − δ < 11+δ for any 0 < δ ≤ 1 and m = m = mmax is the optimal strategy of
the manager with θ < 11+δ .
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A.7 Proof of Theorem 7
The optimal forecasts of the analysts given their payoff function (7) with n = m
and n = m are:
F ∗t = px+ (1− p)x+ pm+ (1− p)m (80)
F ∗t+1 = px+ (1− p)x− µm− (1− µ)m (81)
Given the best response of the analysts to the manager guidance, the manager’s
payoffs are:
uM (.) = (1− θ)max[x+m+ δ(px+ (1− p)x− µm− (1− µ)m)−X; 0]
+δθpmax[x−m−X; 0]
+δθ(1− p)max[x−m−X; 0] (82)
respectively
uM (.) = (1− θ)max[x+m+ δ(px+ (1− p)x− µm− (1− µ)m)−X; 0]
+δθpmax[x−m−X; 0]
+δθ(1− p)max[x−m−X; 0] (83)
To determine the manager’s optimal manipulation strategy while considering
its impact on the best response of the analysts we consider different strategies.
Given the manager’s payoffs there are three reasonable candidates in both states,
i.e. m1 = m1 = mmin, m2 = m2 = 0, or m3 = m3 = mmax. If xt = x, the
manager’s call options have the following values:
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 (1− p)(x− x) + δX (1− p)(x− x) 0
m3 (1− p)(x− x) + (1− δ)mmax + δX 0 0
Thus, the strategy m2 = 0 is a dominated strategy for any θ ∈ [0, 1]. The
manager chooses m1 = mmin if uM (m1) > uM (m3), which is true for
θ >
(2− p− δ)(x− x) + δX
(2− p)(x− x) + δX (84)
Thus, if θ ∈ [0, (2−p−δ)(x−x)+δX(2−p)(x−x)+δX ] the manager choosesm3 = mmax. If xt = x
the manager’s call options have the following values.
Ct Ct+1 Ct+1
m1 0 (1− p)(x− x)−mmin −p(x− x)−mmin
m2 0 (1− p)(x− x) 0
m3 −p(x− x) +mmax(1− δ) + δX 0 0
for δ < 2p−22p−3
The manager chooses the strategy m3 = mmax if θ <
Ct(m3)
Ct(m3)−δmmin , which
is equivalent to the condition (65).
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